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Episode 1 of “Control in AI”—a series exploring how power is really shifting in the age of artificial intelligence.

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For over a decade, the debate around Ticketmaster relied on the constraints of a 2010 negotiated settlement with the DOJ, where core economic questions were never fully adjudicated. Now, the story has changed. We discuss the recent landmark case where a jury officially found that Live Nation-Ticketmaster possessed monopoly power, engaged in exclusionary conduct, and caused consumer harm.

Tune in as we unpack the details of the “Antitrust Decision Funnel” and explain why determining liability is just the beginning. We explore the jury’s estimation of a $1.72 (or 1-3%) ticket overcharge and discuss how this magnitude of harm will influence the judge’s ultimate decision on remedies, which could range from damages to structural breakups. Finally, we compare the U.S. antitrust path—which seeks to restore competitive conditions—to alternative approaches, like Ontario’s direct price regulation that caps resale tickets at face value.

If you want to understand the economics, the law, and what this verdict actually means for your next concert, this episode is for you!

Brussels is back in the merger debate. But this time, something important has changed. This is no longer just about competition policy. It is about industrial power. Europe is caught in an uncomfortable position. The US has scale and deep capital markets. China has scale and state-backed industrial policy. Europe has rules—and fragmented firms. That imbalance is now shaping the policy conversation.

A familiar idea has returned: Europe may need “champions.” Not marginal tweaks. Bigger firms. Fewer constraints. A different tolerance for concentration in strategic sectors.

Two cases still anchor the debate. Airbus is the success story. Political coordination produced a global competitor to Boeing. People routinely cite it as proof that scale can be built in Europe. Siemens–Alstom is the counterexample. The EU blocked the merger in 2019. Critics still argue Europe chose competition orthodoxy over industrial scale, while China continued building large state-supported industrial groups.

These cases now carry more weight in political debate than in legal reasoning. But the economics are less accommodating than the narrative. The empirical literature is clear on one point. Horizontal mergers tend to increase prices and market power. Consumer welfare typically declines.

There is also a second-order issue. Large firms are often more productive. But that does not prove mergers create productivity. It may simply reflect selection. Strong firms grow. Weak firms exit or are acquired.

Policy discussions increasingly blur that distinction. Inside Europe, the divide is predictable.

France and Germany are more open to revisiting merger rules in strategic sectors. Smaller member states are more cautious. For them, concentration is not a theory question. It is a domestic market structure question.

The result is a deeper shift in framing.

Merger control is no longer being discussed purely as competition policy. It is being pulled into industrial strategy and geopolitical positioning. That is a meaningful break from the post-1990 consensus.

Implications for Other Jurisdictions

The question is whether others will follow Europe. The answer is “not directly.” But pressures are moving in parallel.

In the United States, merger enforcement is becoming more aggressive in areas such as technology, labor markets, and innovation. But it remains grounded in antitrust doctrine. It is not an industrial policy tool.

The United Kingdom is following a similar path. More flexibility at the margins. No fundamental shift in framework.

Several Asian economies already operate closer to a hybrid model, linking industrial policy and firm structure more closely. For them, Europe’s debate looks familiar rather than novel.

China sits in a different category. It is less a model than a reference point. It shapes the scale question that Europe is now grappling with.

So the global picture is not convergence. It is fragmentation under shared pressure.

Different systems are adjusting in various ways. Europe is unlikely to export its merger rules. But it may export something more important. A shift in what merger control is for. Not only prices and efficiency. But scale. power. and geopolitical position. That is a different debate. And it is already underway.

Key Discussion Points:

• The Case for Intervention: Breaking price chokeholds and preventing consumer “lock-in”.

• The Risks of Regulation: Visualizing the compliance trap and system-wide performance degradation.

• The “Rescued” Competitor: Why the DOJ’s win against the JetBlue/Spirit merger resulted in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

• Global Competition: How blocking domestic mergers like Tapestry/Capri may handicap American brands against European conglomerates.

Call to Action: This series is reader-supported. Consider becoming a free or paid subscriber at EconWorks to support our work. What do you think—are regulators getting it right, or is the cure worse than the disease?

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In this episode, we talk about the recent state-led antitrust case against Ticketmaster and what the limits of state antitrust power are. We talk about the history of the 2010 DOJ settlement, what the jury's finding of a $1.72 overcharge means for the company's future, and why figuring out who is responsible is just the first step. Finally, we compare the US approach of restoring competition to international approaches, like Ontario's, restoring competition with international approaches, such as direct price caps on ticket resales.

If you've ever been angry about buying concert tickets, you won't want to miss this explanation of the law, the money, and what comes next!

Background: The DOJ Settlement and Its Limits

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In this episode, we dive into the “Remedies Toolkit” used by the DOJ and FTC. We analyze the three main pillars of intervention and their potential unintended consequences:

• Behavioral Remedies: Can conduct rules turn agile tech firms into sluggish bureaucracies?

• Structural Remedies: Does forcing a breakup lead to operational collapse and broken tools?

• Interoperability Mandates: Are we creating security and stability nightmares in the name of open standards?

We also examine real-world case studies beyond Big Tech, including the JetBlue/Spirit merger blockade and the Tapestry/Capri fashion deal.

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We analyze the competing economic theories at play: the regulator’s “ecosystem” theory of harm versus the tech giant’s defense against “free riding” on proprietary hardware. We also discuss the practical implications of the new fee structures for developers, the battle over “Proximity Pix,” and why international administrative regulators are succeeding where traditional U.S. courts have historically moved slowly.

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Ever paid more for the exact same grocery item or flight than someone else? That’s surveillance pricing (aka personalized/algorithmic pricing).

Companies use AI and your personal data — browsing history, location, device info, search habits, even battery level or mouse movements — to estimate your “willingness to pay” and charge you individually.

Changes in the US (April 2026)

• There is no federal ban yet. The One Fair Price Act would make it illegal to use personal information to set prices for each person. Still in the committee.

• New York leads: The Algorithmic Pricing Disclosure Act (effective Nov 2025) requires clear notice: “THIS PRICE WAS SET BY AN ALGORITHM USING YOUR PERSONAL DATA.” NY AG Letitia James is enforcing it with penalties of up to $1,000 per violation.

• State action: Dozens of bills in 20+ states propose bans/restrictions (esp. groceries), including California, Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Maryland. Some add disclosure + opt-out.

The FTC Study (January 2025 Preliminary Findings)

In July 2024, the FTC launched a Section 6(b) study into the surveillance pricing ecosystem, issuing compulsory orders to eight intermediary companies (Mastercard, Revionics, Bloomreach, JPMorgan Chase, Task Software, PROS, Accenture, and McKinsey & Co.) that sell AI-powered pricing tools to retailers.

Methodology

The FTC used its Section 6(b) authority under the FTC Act for wide-ranging market studies. It issued formal orders requiring detailed written reports on the following:

• Targeted Pricing Solutions and User Segmentation Solutions (tools that set/adjust prices, quantity, or availability based on consumer data).

• Types of products/services, technical implementation, data sources/collection methods, customer base, and potential consumer impacts.

The January 2025 staff research summaries analyzed documents from six respondents (July–December 2024). Information is aggregated/anonymized to protect trade secrets. The summaries are preliminary, with noted limitations (not fully representative; study deprioritized under new leadership; no full final report yet).

Key Findings

• Wide use of personal data: location, demographics, browsing/purchase history, mouse movements, abandoned carts, inferred traits (e.g., new parent status).

• Real-time individualized pricing, segmentation, adjusted discounts/availability, and product rankings.

• Intermediaries serve at least 250 clients across groceries, apparel, etc.

• Claimed revenue boosts: 2–5% (or 1–4% margin increases).

Comparison to EU Studies & Approach

While the US FTC study is a targeted 6(b) investigation focused on intermediary pricing tools, data sources, and claimed business benefits (with emphasis on the opaque market and consumer fairness/privacy), the EU has taken a broader, more integrated regulatory lens:

Key EU studies & their methodologies

• 2018 European Commission Consumer Market Study (largest empirical work): Combined (1) an EU-wide online consumer survey; (2) mystery shopping on 160 e-commerce sites across 8 Member States (CZ, DE, ES, FR, PL, RO, SE, UK) in 4 sectors (TVs, shoes, hotels, airline tickets)—717 evaluations by 254 shoppers using standardized “personalised” vs. anonymized/VPN control browsers; and (3) a behavioral experiment. It found no consistent systematic personalized pricing (small/occasional differences, especially in travel), but widespread personalized ranking of offers.

• 2022 European Parliament Study ("Personalized Pricing” by Rott, Strycharz, and Alleweldt): Primarily a desk-based review—conceptual analysis of pricing types, synthesis of existing empirical evidence (including the 2018 study), consumer attitude surveys from literature, and detailed legal gap analysis under EU consumer, competition, and data pro The IMCO committee requested this, and no new primary data collection is planned. a collection.

• BEUC (consumer org) reports (e.g., 2023 position paper): Draw on the above plus targeted consumer surveys (e.g., 2023 polling across 8 member states showing ~40% discomfort with the practice) and advocacy-focused legal/economic reviews.

Methodological differences: EU studies lean on mystery shopping, large-scale surveys, behavioral experiments, and literature reviews (real-world testing + consumer perceptions) rather than compulsory company orders. They integrate competition law (algorithmic collusion risks), consumer protection, and GDPR (profiling/transparency/consent rules) more tightly.

Ongoing national probes (e.g., Dutch/Italian airline algorithmic pricing) and confidential EC investigations continue this evidence-gathering.

Regulatory contrast:

• EU: Ex-ante rules via GDPR (automated decisions), Consumer Rights Directive (personalized pricing disclosure since 2019), and Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. The upcoming Digital Fairness Act (expected draft 2026) targets unfair personalization/dynamic pricing more comprehensively.

• US: More fragmented, ex-post/state-driven.

Both note consumer backlash risks and mixed welfare effects, but the EU embeds data protection more deeply.

US Cases & Enforcement

• Instacart spotlight: The 2025 Consumer Reports/Groundwork study showed up to 23% higher prices for the same cart. Instacart paused AI experiments amid backlash. The NY AG demanded disclosure compliance; the FTC issued an investigative demand; the House Oversight inquired.

• Lawsuits & challenges: Retail groups challenged NY’s law (dismissed). More litigation expected.

Economic Effects of Potential Bans

Pro-ban side:

Greater transparency, fairness, and trust. Reduces hidden exploitation and excessive data collection.

Economist cautions:

Uniform pricing can raise average prices or reduce access for price-sensitive buyers (perfect price discrimination often maximizes total output).

Risks losing beneficial targeted discounts/loyalty deals.

Retailers may shift to higher base prices or cut efficiency innovations. Net effects are mixed.

Data on full bans remains limited, but cases like Instacart show clear reputational risks.

Key Topics Discussed:

• The Shift in Enforcement: Why U.S. antitrust complaints are focusing on user choice architecture and market access rather than just price.

• The Five Pillars of Conduct: Default placement (Google), App Store rules (Apple), Marketplace ranking (Amazon), Feed curation (Meta), and OS integration (Microsoft).

• Feedback Loop Dynamics: How data accumulation creates self-reinforcing cycles of usage and performance.

• The Future of Policy: Assessing innovation, access, and interoperability in platform-mediated markets.

Technical Deep Dive: For our paid subscribers, we have released a technical appendix featuring a simplified economic model that assesses how these governance choices affect new business entry and innovation incentives. To access the full report, visit

In this video, we break down the core arguments: Is Apple protecting billions in proprietary hardware R&D, or is it acting as an illegal gatekeeper by taxing a public utility? We explore the new tiered commission structure, the “free rider” economic defense, and why Brazil’s administrative laws are moving much faster than U.S. judicial courts.

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We break down the key mechanisms of platform power:

• Default Placement & Behavior: How search and browser defaults steer user usage.

• App Store & OS Governance: The impact of rules on developer entry and pricing.

• Ranking & Feeds: How marketplace algorithms and feed curation allocate demand and attention.

• Integration & Data: The feedback loops where usage generates data, improving performance and reinforcing dominance.

Does platform conduct limit innovation and choice, or does it enhance security and product quality? We examine the competing claims and the evolving framework for digital competition policy.

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Hey everyone,

If you’re a frequent flyer, an investor, or just someone who pays attention to sky-high airfares, you probably saw the headlines this week. Bloomberg broke the story on April 13, 2026: United Airlines CEO Scott Kirby reportedly pitched a potential merger (or “combination”) with American Airlines directly to Trump administration officials back in late February.

The reaction was immediate. In one day, American's stock went up almost 8%. United rose a more modest 2-3%. Analysts called it everything from a “trial balloon” to “dead on arrival.” And for good reason.

Let’s break down what this rumor actually means, why it’s bubbling up now, and what it would (or wouldn’t) do to the skies we all fly in.

The Scale Would Be Historic

A United + American tie-up would instantly create the largest airline in the world by almost every measure:

• Fleet: Roughly 2,874 aircraft

• Annual revenue: North of $114 billion (nearly double Delta’s)

• U.S. domestic market share:

• By revenue passenger miles (the best measure of actual traffic, per latest BTS data through January 2026): ~34% combined (United 16.7% + American 17.4%)

• By available seats / scheduled capacity (2025-2026 schedules, per OAG and analysts): ~40%

For context, the current “Big Four” (Delta, American, Southwest, and United) already control about 68-75% of U.S. domestic flying. This one deal would give a single carrier roughly the same slice that the entire legacy industry had two decades ago.

It would dominate major hubs and overlapping routes. Pre-divestiture estimates show the combo controlling 50%+ of domestic capacity at 159 U.S. airports. The combo would be massive in major cities like New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Dallas, Houston, Miami, Denver, Philadelphia, and Washington.

Why Is This Coming Up Now?

Two big pressures:

1. Jet fuel prices are brutal after recent geopolitical shocks, particularly the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict, which aligns with Kirby’s February meeting. Fuel is one of the biggest variable costs, and weaker carriers are feeling it more.

2. Profit gaps are widening. United and Delta are the clear profit leaders. America has been lagging (thin net income relative to its size). Kirby—who ironically helped engineer American’s 2013 US Airways merger when he worked there—has publicly said smaller/weaker airlines will struggle while the strong get stronger.

Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy recently signaled the administration sees “room for some mergers,” and Trump has historically loved big deals. So Kirby floated the idea. No formal talks appear to be happening, and both airlines and the White House have stayed silent.

The Antitrust Reality Check

Here’s where the dream (or nightmare, depending on your view) dies.

Experts across the board — from Cornell law professors to Wall Street analysts to consumer groups — say approval is extremely unlikely, even in a more business-friendly regulatory environment:

• Massive route overlaps (hundreds of city pairs where competition would drop to one or two carriers)

• Required divestitures would be enormous (gates, slots, entire routes)

• Labor unions, rivals (Delta, Southwest, JetBlue, etc.), and consumer advocates would scream bloody murder over higher fares and less choice

• One analyst said plainly: “I can’t even see the slightest chance that a court would allow it.”

Past mega-mergers (Delta-Northwest 2008, United-Continental 2010, and American-US Airways 2013) already consolidated the industry. The DOJ has taken a firm stance since then. A 30-40% domestic share would raise all possible concerns.

What Would It Mean for You, the Traveler?

If it somehow happened (a big if):

• Short term: Chaos during integration, possible fare hikes on overlapping routes, but also potentially better international networks and loyalty program perks.

• Long term: Less competition = higher prices on many domestic routes. Corporate travel managers would lose leverage. Disruptions (weather, mechanical) could cascade harder with fewer backup carriers.

But again, it’s not happening. This feels more like a strategy to create opportunities for future partnerships, or Kirby exploring options, than an imminent deal.

The Bigger Picture

U.S. airlines are healthier and more profitable than pre-2010, but the industry remains incredibly concentrated. The top four control the vast majority of capacity, while high fuel costs and capacity discipline have squeezed ultra-low-cost carriers (Frontier and Spirit).

Mergers can deliver efficiencies and better service on some routes — we’ve seen that. But they also reduce choice, and history shows much of the benefit flows to shareholders, not necessarily to passengers paying $400+ for a coast-to-coast ticket.

For now, the incident remains one of the biggest “what if” stories in aviation in years.

What do you think? Would you want a single mega-carrier dominating the U.S. skies, or does the current (already concentrated) setup feel like enough? Drop your thoughts in the comments—especially if you fly United or American regularly.

Safe travels,

EconWorks Observer

Sources for data: Bloomberg/Reuters reporting, U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (RPM through Jan 2026), OAG schedules, analyst commentary from TD Cowen, Jefferies, etc. All public as of April 15, 2026.

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