If companies did collude to fix the price of eggs, why was no one convicted?
In this video we look at one of the most misunderstood aspects of competition law: the distinction between criminal prosecution, public civil enforcement, and private litigation.
With the recent egg benchmark manipulation case as a case study, we explain the following:
how a small benchmark can affect a much larger market,
why benchmark manipulation is not a conventional price-fixing cartel,
why governments sometimes prefer civil settlements over criminal convictions,
why private lawsuits play a much more important role in the United States than in many other countries,
and how we can better design benchmarks to reduce manipulation.
The economics of cartel behavior may be universal. The institutions that are used to detect, prosecute and remedy it are not.
Read the full article and graphic analysis:
Why Did an Alleged Egg Cartel End in a Civil Settlement?
At first glance, that may seem surprising. If competitors coordinated their conduct, why would the government settle rather than prosecute them criminally?
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